Trans-species social justice
A. Matsuoka and J. Sorenson June 2019.

The term social justice refers to creation of a fair and equitable society and the idea of the common good. Typically, this is considered in terms of humans alone but this is a limited understanding that privileges some beings at the expense of others on the basis of species. Based on Critical Animal Studies’ perspective, we propose to consider justice beyond human animals, i.e. trans-species social justice.

Trans-species social justice refers to the “consideration of interests of all animals (including humans) in order to achieve institutional conditions free from oppression and domination” (Matsuoka & Sorenson 2014: 70)

The idea of trans-species social justice is still evolving as we continue our research; however, we consider three essential components. One of them is speciesism. The term speciesism was coined in 1970 by Richard Ryder who characterized it as a form of prejudice that prioritized human interests over those of nonhuman animals. David Nibert characterized it as an ideology that serves to legitimize a particular social order. The ideology of speciesism operates to preserve the privileges of those who benefit most from oppression. The ideology of speciesism normalizes the oppression of nonhuman animals under capitalism as they are viewed as commodities and resources for human use. As you can see from our definition, we consider speciesism is not only a prejudice but an ideology which supports institutional conditions.

The second key component of trans-species social justice is that to understand social justice in relation to domination and oppression. Iris Marion Young (2011) argued that we should understand social justice through social relations of domination and oppression rather than conceptualizing it distributional justice. We adopt her understanding of social justice as a condition that enables that development of individual capacities. Oppression refers to the structural conditions that create and maintain disadvantage for certain groups. Oppression emerges through power relationships such as exploitation, violence, marginalization, powerlessness and cultural imperialism.  This understanding of social justice is critical for transformative nature of trans-species social justice. Methodologically, trans-species social justice questions our taken for granted epistemological and ontological views.  Questioning anthropocentrism is a good example.

The third key component trans-species social justice is intersectionality. Valuing ecofeminist contributions in Critical Animal Studies, a trans-species social justice perspective also recognizes that other forms of oppression often intersect with speciesism. For example, a slaughterhouse is not only the site of violence against nonhuman animals but also of exploitation of human workers or communities who typically have few choices in terms of employment or environment (We addressed this in Matsuoka and Sorenson, 2013, with social work in mind). Furthermore, the violence inflicted on nonhuman animals has wide-ranging effects on those workers, who not only suffer high rates of physical injuries but also psychological trauma that results in substance abuse and domestic violence. Similarly, the killing of billions of nonhuman animals for food is not only brutal and unnecessary but has disastrous consequences for the environment and biodiversity, as well as contributing to serious human health problems.  It is imperative to understand that trans-species social justice considers intersectionality of oppression not from a utilitarian perspective but rather from respecting other beings’ rights. Before we conclude this short introduction to trans-species social justice, very briefly we touch on animal welfare vs animal rights as a foundation for understanding trans-species social justice.  We consider that without this foundational understanding we will miss transformative opportunities in any discipline, especially in social work.

We would like to highlight two key thinkers who influenced the development of animal studies.  Philosopher Peter Singer (1990) maintains that if animals are capable of experiencing pain, their interests must be taken into account. Singer refers to the principle of equal consideration of interests, saying that similar interests must be given similar moral attention. However, this does not mean identical treatment and Singer maintains that equal consideration may result in different treatment. Emphasizing their capacity to experience pain and suffering, Singer argued for the moral consideration of nonhuman animals and his book Animal Liberation was a key text in the development of ideas about animal welfare. However, Singer did not argue for the idea of animal rights and suggested that nonhuman animals could be used instrumentally if they were given humane treatment.

In The Case for Animal Rights, philosopher Tom Regan (1983, 2004) extended the argument beyond Singer’s utilitarian perspective. Regan recognized that nonhuman animals have inherent value beyond their utility for humans and argued that those animals who have subjective awareness are subjects of a life and, therefore, have moral rights. Regan argued that because nonhuman animals have moral rights they cannot be used as the means to human ends and that we have obligations not to harm them.

A trans-species social justice perspective recognizes that, simply because they are sentient, nonhuman animals have intrinsic value and should not be regarded as property or resources or used instrumentally. Thus, a justice perspective differs from a welfarist perspective that accepts the legitimacy of using animals if they are treated well. Let us tie this back to our slaughterhouse example. If we support slaughterhouse practices as long as they do not harm human health, we miss opportunities to change oppressive institutional conditions.  Trans-species social justice critiques intersectional nature of power relations, domination and oppression, not only of humans but of all animals so that we can address the root of the problems.

We have taken up these ideas on Critical Animal Studies and trans-species social justice in our edited books Critical Animal Studies: Toward Trans-species Social Justice (2018) and Dog’s Best Friend?: Rethinking Human-Canid Relations (forthcoming). Please also check Thomas Ryan’s book (2014) Animals in social work.  We have a chapter in it to explain more thoroughly by going over each five faces of oppression.

References:

Matsuoka, A. and Sorenson, J. (Eds).  (2018) Critical Animal Studies: Toward Trans-species Social Justice, London: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Matsuoka, A.  & Sorenson, J. (2014). Social Justice beyond Human Beings: Trans-Species Social Justice, In T. Ryan (Ed.). Animals in social work: Why and how they matter. (pp.94-119).  London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Matsuoka, A.  & Sorenson, J. (2013). Human consequences of animal exploitation: Needs for redefining social welfare, Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, XL(4), 7-32. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol40/iss4/3/

Regan, T. (1983, 2004). The case for animal rights. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Singer, P. (1990). Animal liberation. New York: Ecco.

Sorenson, J. & Matsuoka, A. (Eds). (2019) Dog’s Best Friend?: Rethinking Human-Canid Relations. Montreal and Kingston: McGill & Queen University Press.

Sorenson, J.  & Matsuoka, A. (2019). Introduction. In Sorenson, J.  & Matsuoka, A. (Eds). Dog’s Best Friend?: Rethinking Human-Canid Relations. McGill & Queen University Press.

Sorenson, J.  & Matsuoka, A. (2018). Introduction. In Matsuoka, A. & Sorenson, J. (Eds). Critical Animal Studies: Toward Trans-Species Social Justice.(1-17). London: Rowman & Littlefield International. https://www.rowmaninternational.com/book/critical_animal_studies/3-156-8606c11f-3a7d-4a69-9f66-b5ab28e57336

Young, I.M., (1990, 2011). Justice and the politics of difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.